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21. Introduction
It is a cornerstone result of the standard Cournot model of
oligopoly that industry profits will decrease as the number of firms
competing in the product market increases. The nature of this
relationship influences, inter alia, the incentives of firms both to merge
and to deter entry by new firms: it is a fundamental determinant of
market structure. In this paper, we show that under bilateral oligopoly,
when downstream firms’ costs are not exogenous but are determined
through (Nash) bargaining with upstream agents, the relationship
between industry profits and market size depends on the relative
bargaining power of the downstream and upstream agents. If the
former have sufficient bargaining power, then there is a range over
which industry profits increase with the number of firms competing in
the product market.
As far as we are aware, this is a new result. Dowrick (1989)
considers a bilateral oligopoly - in which unions act as the upstream
agent – and shows how the bargained wage varies with market size,
but does not focus on the relationship between profits and the
number of firms. Horn and Wolinsky (1988) examine a differentiated
oligopoly with upstream agents (unions) and downstream firms, but
assume a duopolistic market.1
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
outline the basic model and in Section 3 we draw out the implications
of the model for the relationship between industry profits and market
size. Section 4 concludes.
                                                
1 Similarly, Naylor (1999) considers unionized oligopoly in the context of
international trade and economic integration, but does not allow the number of
firms to vary.
32. The Model
We follow Horn and Wolinsky (1988) in supposing that the
upstream agents are firm-specific trade unions bargaining with firms
over the wage rate. We analyze a non-cooperative two-stage game in
which n identical firms produce an identical good. In the first stage
(the labor market game), each firm independently bargains over its
wage with a local labor union: bargaining is decentralized. The
outcome of the labor market game is described by the solution to the
n union-firm pairs’ sub-game perfect best-reply functions in wages. In
the second stage (the Cournot product market game), each firm sets
its output – given pre-determined wage choices from stage 1 – to
maximize profits. We proceed by backward induction.
(i) Stage 2: the product market game
Let linear product market demand be written as:
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written as:
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where iw  is the outcome of the wage bargain for union-firm i. In
this short-run analysis, we exclude non-labor costs. We also assume a
constant marginal product of labor, and set this as a numeraire.
Under the Cournot-Nash assumption, differentiation of (2) with
respect to ix  yields the first-order condition for profit maximization
by firm i, from which it is straightforward to derive firm i’s best-reply
function in output space as:
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Solving across the n first-order conditions, the n best-reply
functions can be re-written as sub-game perfect labor demand
equations. From equation (3) for example, the expression for firm i’s
labour demand is
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It is useful to express firm i’s profits in terms of the vector of all
firms’ wages. Substituting (4) in (2), we obtain
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From (5), it follows that in symmetric equilibrium, with ,wwi =
( )
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where w is the outcome of the Stage 1 wage-bargaining game. It
follows from (6) that, in equilibrium, industry profits are given by
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We note that if w is given exogenously (or if unions have no
bargaining power) then, with ww=  in (7), industry profits are falling
in n, the number of firms in the industry, as
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for 1>n .
(ii) Stage 1: the labour market game
We assume that the representative trade union has the objective of
rent-maximization. For union i bargaining with firm i, the union utility
function is written as
[ ] iii xwwU -= , (9)
where w denotes the wage which would obtain in a competitive
non-unionised labour market. Under the assumption of a right-to-
manage model of Nash-bargaining over wages, we write the
maximand as:
bb p -= 1iii UB , (10)
where we assume that disagreement payoffs are zero. b
represents the union’s Nash-bargaining power in the asymmetric wage
bargain.
Substituting (4), (6) and (9) in (10) yields
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The first order condition derived from the Nash maximand is
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from which it follows that, in symmetric sub-game perfect
equilibrium,
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Substituting (13) in (7) gives equilibrium industry profits of
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3. Industry profits and market size
We now investigate how industry profits vary with the number of
firms in the market. Differentiating (14) with respect to n, we obtain
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which is positive – implying that industry profits are non-
decreasing in the number of firms – if the following condition is
satisfied:
( ) 0322 2 ³--- bb nn . (16)
7Initially, consider condition (16) for the special case that 1=b . In
this case, the condition is satisfied for 31 ££- n . It follows that for
this monopoly union case industry profits are at a maximum when
3=n . Figure 1 depicts (15) for this case of 1=b .åp
Figure 1 The derivative of industry profits with respect to n,
for 1=b .
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9We now address the question of how the industry profit-
maximising value of n varies with b . We do this by evaluating
equation (14) for different particular values of nand solving for the
critical values of b  associated with intersections of the industry profit
functions for the different values of n. The industry profit functions
for n = 1, 2, 3 and 4 are plotted against b  in Figure 2. In bold, we
highlight that part of each profit function associated with maximum
industry profits, given the value of b .
11
Figure 2 Industry profits and bargaining power for particular values of n.
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From Figure 2, we can see that, in equilibrium, industry profits are
at a maximum:
(i) when 1=n  if 25.0 <£ b
(ii) when 2=n  if 8.25. << b
(iii) when 3=n  if 18. £< b
At the critical value 25.=¢b , industry profits are equal for 1=n
and 2=n  and for the critical value 8.=¢¢b , industry profits are the
same for 2=n  and 3=n .
It follows that the industry profit-maximizing number of firms is
increasing, up to a maximum of 3=n , in the extent of union
bargaining power. The intuition for the result is straightforward. In the
standard oligopoly model, an increase in the number of firms
unambiguously reduces industry profits through increased product
market competition. For the bilateral oligopoly case developed in the
current paper, this profit-reducing product market demand effect still
operates, but is offset by a profit-enhancing effect within the labour
market. The increase in n has the effect of increasing the elasticity of
the derived demand for labour and this leads unions to bargain for
lower wages. Notice from (13) that, in equilibrium, the bargained wage
is decreasing in n. If b  is small – or if  n is large – then this effect is
relatively insignificant. But if b  is sufficiently large, and n sufficiently
small, then the profit-enhancing labour market effect dominates and
profits are increasing in n.
4.Conclusions
We have shown that in a unionized bilateral oligopoly with
decentralized bargaining, industry profits are initially increasing in the
number of firms, n, in the product market if unions have sufficient
bargaining power, b . The standard oligopoly result is turned round
because an increase in n causes a profit-enhancing fall in bargained
12
wages and this dominates the standard profit-reducing effect of an
increase in n if b  is sufficiently large and n is sufficiently small. As
we have focused exclusively on the case of the rent-maximizing
union,2 it can be shown that the results also obtain in a standard
upstream firm/downstream firm setting.
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